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We introduce a model of fishing behavior that features costly targeting of a spatially
and temporally heterogenous, multiple-species fish stock. We characterize fishing behav-
ior under species-specific regulations including time-area-depth closures, per-trip landings
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necessary conditions which form the basis of our empirical estimation. Data from the Gulf
of Mexico commercial reef fish fishery are used to estimate the model. The estimated har-
vest technology exhibits local weak output disposability which are linked to spatially and
temporally dependent stock conditions in the reef fish fishery. The model predicts harvests,
discards and fishing profit across multiple species, and importantly across continuous space
and time dimensions. Policy simulations further identify behavioral responses to closure
regulations, individual tradeable quota management and recent sea turtle bycatch man-
agement rules which impose limits on fishing depth. Our model overcomes limitations of
discrete choice spatial fishing behavioral models, and offers a powerful tool for improving
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1 Introduction
Fisheries management problems have been recently linked to a reliance on overly simplistic
models of marine ecosystems (Worm et al., 2009). Management policies are often de-
signed around single-species principles that ignore complex ecological interactions among
multiple species and treat spatially heterogeneous metapopulations as spaceless whole fish
stocks.1 Similar criticisms can be leveled on economic models of fishing behavior which
often exhibit a disconnect between ecological complexity, decision processes of fishermen
and the outcomes of interest to resource managers such as harvests across space, time and
depth, discards, and regulatory response. We introduce and estimate a model of fishing
behavior that explicitly links the composition of a multiple-species fish stock across time
and space, prices, and regulations under which harvesting operations are conducted with
profit-maximizing harvest and discard choices of commercial fishermen. Data from the US
Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery is used to estimate the model and demonstrate its effec-
tiveness for evaluating regulations commonly used in commercial fisheries.
A workhorse in the analysis of spatial fishing behavior is the discrete choice random
utility model (RUM).2 A standard application to the analysis of spatial fishing behavior
begins by dividing the fishing grounds into a finite number of mutually exclusive regions
or sites. The RUM assumes that on each trip from port, fishermen select the site that
yields highest expected utility. A multinomial logit or probit regression is used to estimate
the unknown parameters of a utility function defined over sites by matching observed site
choices in the data to a measure, typically the researchers estimate, of the expected pay-
offs and associated utility at each site in the choice set.3 The fitted model predicts the
1A growing view among fisheries scientists and marine ecologists is that a more holistic approach will
improve the management of ocean fisheries resources (Brodziak and Link, 2002; Pikitch et al., 2004; U.S.
Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004). The challenges and opportunities that accompany spatial fisheries
management are discussed in Wilen (2004). Herrera (2006) outlines the potential benefits of spatial fishing
regulations.
2The random utility model (RUM) was developed by Daniel McFadden to study transportation choices.
The original set up assumes that a particular transportation choice yields utility U which is known fully by
the decision maker. Utility is decomposed as U = V + e, where only V is observable by the researcher; e is
an unobserved component known to the decision maker. In empirical applications V may be conditioned
on observables such as distance to a destination, average traffic patterns, road conditions, etc. Bockstael
and Opaluch (1983) and Eales and Wilen (1986) present early applications of the RUM framework to study
spatial fishing behavior. Numerous applications of the RUM to spatial fishing data have appeared in the
resource economics literature. A special issue of Marine Resource Economics (Volume 19, Number 1, 2004)
is dedicated to analysis of spatial fishing behavior. Modifications of the basic model structure include
Mistiaen and Strand (2000); Haab et al., (2008), Haynie and Layton (2010) and Abbott and Wilen, (2011).
3Payoff expectations at competing sites must be estimated from observed data and typically involve
regressing past payoff on observed data, e.g. site and/or fisherman characteristics, to form a predicted
payoff across sites. The model yields an estimate of the likelihood that a fishermen will select a size given
the site observables. Smith (2000) provides an overview of the methodology. Berman (2007) and Curtis
and McConnell (2004) discuss limitations in analysis of spatial fishing behavior.
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likelihood of taking a trip to a particular site, conditional on observable characteristics of
the sites, the fishermen and the market for factor inputs and harvested output.4
Our model relaxes several restrictive assumptions implicit in discrete choice RUM ap-
proach and circumvents limitations encountered in their application. First, we begin with
a standard model of production behavior where fishermen are assumed to organize fac-
tor inputs and select the mix of harvested species to maximize profits. The optimization
is subject to the constraints imposed by the technology, market prices, stock conditions,
and regulations imposed by the management authority. Regulations often take the form
of species-specific landings limits, or time, depth and/or area closures. Regulations thus
impose constraints on the vector of feasible landings. A system of Kuhn-Tucker necessary
conditions characterize profit maximizing fishing behavior. These conditions form a sys-
tem of Tobit equations which we use to estimated a parametric cost function following the
method of Wales and Woodland (1983). Our cost functional form features the property
of crucial property of local weak output disposability which captures costly targeting in
a multiple species fishery (Turner, 1995; Singh and Weninger, 2009). Importantly, our
unit of analysis is a vector of spatially, temporally and depth-delineated profit maximizing
harvests and at-sea discards which are predicted under profit maximization if, for example,
a species if fish is unmarketable or its landings are prohibited by regulation. The model
thus directly predicts outcomes of management interest, harvest, discard and profits, for
given stock conditions, prices and regulations.
Our approach avoids the curse of dimensionality that limits RUM applications to spa-
tial fishing behavior (Berrmann, 2007). We assume that multiple-species reef fish fish stock
abundance varies smoothly across space and time. The ecological spatial scale in our model
matches reality and the spatial scale at which commercial fishermen operate. Commercial
fishermen select fishing locations, dates, and depths to harvest targeted species, and avoid
species whose harvest is unprofitable or prohibited by regulation. Preferred locations may
be a few or hundreds of kilometers apart. Fisheries typically span vast areas containing
thousands of potential fishing sites. In the discrete choice RUM framework, researchers are
forced to make untenable assumptions concerning the spatial choice set facing fishermen,
and the information that is available regarding the fishing opportunities at each location.5
We estimate a structural, multiple-species target cost surface that describes fishing profit
4One limitation of the approach is that a second model is needed to predict the on-site harvest and
discard activities of the fisherman.
5See Berrmann (2007) for a discussion of the curse of dimensionality in estimation of discrete choice
models. Dimensionality and spatial resolution limits of data force researchers to place artificial limits on
the number of choices for which preferences are estimated. This forces coarse geographical division of the
fishing grounds, and coarse descriptions of spatial fishing patterns. Branch et al. (2005) discusses a related
problem where the spatial grid used to divide fisheries geographically—typically latitude and longitude
designations determined by political considerations—may be unrelated to the locations of productive fishing
sites.
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opportunities across continuous space and time. The model offers a powerful tool to as-
sess the ecological and economic implications of commonly used regulatory policies such as
area, time and depth closures.
Application to the Gulf of Mexico, hereafter GOM, reef fish fishery demonstrates the
model’s strengths.6 For example, we are able to show how prices and regulations which
include spatial and temporal closures and per-trip landings limits directly affect targeted
harvesting mortality and bycatch of individual species in the GOM reef fish fishery. Sim-
ulations show how regulations can redirect fishing effort toward unregulated species and
across space and time; patterns that are observed in our data. Spatial-temporal discard
patterns are also impacted by price and regulatory changes. The model predicts that when
fuel prices rise, reef fish fishermen are less likely to target higher priced reef fish species,
and instead are more willing to land a harvest mix with low targeting costs, i.e., a mix
of reef fish species that requires less search and vessel steaming time and less fuel. The
preferred harvest strategy under higher fuel prices also involves fewer at-sea discards.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents back-
ground information for the GOM reef fish fishery and a discussion of the regulations used
to conserve the stock. The background frames the fishing behavioral model which we in-
troduce in section 3. Section 3 presents necessary conditions for profit maximization which
form the basis for our empirical estimation. Data and estimation are presented in section
4. Section 5 reports results. Section 6 and presents policy analysis and simulations. Con-
clusions follow in section 7.
2 Background
The GOM reef fish fishery is a complex of mid-column and bottom-dwelling species con-
sisting of snappers, groupers, tilefishes, amberjacks, triggerfishes, grunts, porgies, and a
host of others. Fishermen also intercept coastal pelagic species including mackerel, dol-
phin (wahoo), sharks and tuna. Total landings in the fishery, all species combined, has
declined from 20.65 million pounds in 2005 to 12.94 million pounds in 2010. Dockside
revenue ranged between $35.07 to $48.57 million during this same period (all values are
reported in 2010 dollars).
6Our approach can be used in any fishery where the composition of the stock exhibits predictability across
spatial and temporal dimensions. Movements of some fish species, e.g., tunas in the pacific ocean, may be
largely random. For many fish species, however, habitat quality is linked to (stable) bottom substrate, or
exhibits seasonal and temporal patterns. Our approach reflects this predictability through spatial-temporal
variation in harvest opportunities and profits.
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Figure 1: Gulf of Mexico Region Designations
The US portion of the fishery extends from the US border with Mexico in the western
Gulf to the Florida Keys. Figure 1 denotes 21 subregions of the fishery located in US
waters. Hereafter, subregions 13-21 will be referred to as the western Gulf region, and
subregions 1-12 as the eastern Gulf region of the reef fish fishery.
The composition of reef fish stocks varies across space. Groupers are most prominent,
by pounds landed and revenue, in the eastern region with red grouper dominating at 29.7%
of landings and 33.9% of revenues in 2010. The largest volume and revenue species in the
western Gulf is red snapper accounting for 43.8% of landed pounds and 53.6% of total
revenue in 2010.
In 2005, over 13,000 reef fish fishing trips were taken by 1,049 vessels. Trips averaged
3.72 days in length. In 2010, total trips numbered 7,558, with 717 vessels participating. The
two major gear types are vertical hook and line gear and longline gear. Trolling gear, gill
nets, traps, and dive gear are used to a much lesser extent and will not be analyzed further.
2.1 Regulations
Regulations in the reef fish fishery vary by species and gear type, and have changed sub-
stantially during our data period. A GOM Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan was first
implemented in 1984. The original plan enacted a few simple harvesting regulations that
prohibited fishing practices considered damaging to the marine environment. Amendment
1 to the management plan set total annual harvest limits for individual reef fish species.
These limits are adjusted from year to year depending on the condition of the stock. Prior
to 2007, managers relied on input controls to ensure the commercial harvest did not ex-
ceed the annual limit. Input controls consisting of gear restrictions, seasonal closures, area
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closures and vessel per-trip catch limits have been used extensively in the fishery.
Red snapper, the most heavily regulated of all reef fish species, has been managed with
seasonal closures and trip catch limits, from 1991 - 2006, and with individual fishing quotas
beginning in 2007. Under individual fishing quotas, managers issues tradable harvest per-
mits in an amount that corresponds to the annual total allowable catch limit. Fishermen
can land any quantity they choose as long as sufficient quota to cover landings is held in
their possession. Several other reef fish species, groupers and tilefish, switched from inputs
controls to individual fishing quotas in 2010.
2.1.1 Input controls
Landings are prohibited during a fishery closure. Closures may apply to individual species
or to groups of species. Periodic closures/openings were adopted in the reef fish fishery
to spread harvests more evenly throughout each year with the goal of moderating the
flow of harvest to processing plants and consumer markets, and thus avoiding marketing
gluts and low prices. During 1991-2006 a typical pattern for red snapper was to open the
fishery for the first 10 days of each month. This pattern continued until the red snapper
total annual allowable catch had been landed. Closures were implemented in the red and
gag grouper fishery from mid-February through mid-March to protect spawning aggrega-
tions. Groupers were otherwise open to fishing until the annual allowable catch for the
species group was met. Deep water groupers and tilefish were open to commercial fishing
at the beginning of each year and closed when the total annual allowable catch was reached.
Maximum per-trip landings limits, applied to individual species or groups of species,
were used in conjunction with the closure policy. The red snapper endorsement system
was in place from 1992-2006. Under this regulation, fishermen were allocated either class
1 or class 2 endorsement permits based in historical participation in years preceding the
introduction of the program.7 Class 1 permitted fishermen were allowed to legally land a
maximum of 2,000 pounds of red snapper per trip during a red snapper opening. Fishermen
who were allocated class 2 permits could land 200 pounds of red snapper per trip during
fishery openings. Fishermen who did not hold endorsement permits were prohibited from
landing red snapper at all times.
7Reef fish fishermen who landed at least 5,000 pounds of red snapper during the 1990-92 seasons were
granted endorsement permits allowing them to land 2,000 pounds of red snapper per trip. All other
qualifying fishermen were restricted to landing 200 pounds or less. In 1998 a licensing system was adopted.
Class 1 endorsement permits were allocated to 138 qualifying vessel operators. Class 2 endorsement permits
were allocated to 559 vessel operators. The endorsement permit regulation ended in 2007 with the adoption
of ITQ management.
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In 2006, managers adopted a maximum 6,000 pound per trip landing limit for all shallow
water grouper species; red, gag and black groupers and other shallow water grouper species.
Temporal and depth closures are also used to reduce fishing pressure on reef fish. The
February 15 - March 15 closure for red and gag grouper discussed above is an example.
Depth restrictions have been in place since 2008 to reduce bycatch of endangered sea tur-
tles by longline vessels. In May 2008 an emergency rule enacted three measures designed
to reduce interactions between turtles and longline fishing gear. Longline fishermen were
prohibited from setting gear shoreward of a line approximating the 35 fathom contour
eastward of the 85 degree, 30 minute longitude (most of the Florida Gulf coast). Second,
longline fishermen were permitted to carry no more that 1,000 hooks onboard the vessel
of which 750 could be rigged for fishing. Hook limits constrain the length of the longline,
which effectively reduces the soak time for the gear. Longer soak times tend to be posi-
tively correlated with sea turtle encounters and mortality. Finally, managers limited the
number of vessels that can use longline gear. Reef fish boats can be re-fitted with vertical
line or longline gear. Managers hoped that limiting longline gear deployment would re-
duce fishery-wide turtle encounters. The May 2008 emergency rule became permanent in
Amendment 31 which was approved in May, 2010.
A minimum size limit regulation is in place for several reef fish species. Fish that do
not meet the minimum length limit must be discarded.8 Our data do not allow us to dis-
tinguish discards that result from closures and landing limits from undersize discards. Size
limit regulations were stable during our study period and therefore we interpret harvest
and discards of undersized fish an unavoidable constraint on harvesting activities. We do
not consider the behavioral implications of the minimum size limit regulations further.
Regulations in the GOM reef fish fishery control quantities of individual reef fish species
that can be legally landed at the fishing dock. At-sea discarding is not monitored and is
legal.9 In fact, when a fishery is closed, fish that is intercepted by the gear, intentionally or
not, must be discarded at sea. Deep-water grouper species are an exception as they do not
survive dramatic depth changes. Deep water groupers that are harvested must be landed
at port.
8Size limits serve multiple management goals. First, restricting the minimize size of landed fish lowers
mortality for a given amount of fishing effort. A second goal of length limit policy is to slow the process
of growth overfishing, i.e., harvesting small but rapidly growing fish counteracts the management goals of
maximizing fishery yield.
9On board observers are used in a small proportion (5%) of longline gear trips to monitor sea turtle
encounters.
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3 A model of regulated fishing behavior
This section presents a model of multiple-species fishing behavior under the regulations
described above.
We assume that reef fish fishermen organize factors of production, e.g., fuel, bait, gear,
and crew labor to search for and harvest multiple reef fish species. We use i = 1, ...,M
to index individual species or stocks. Inputs are purchased competitively and fish that is
landed by the vessel operation is sold in competitive downstream markets at price denoted
pi for species i. We assume prices are fixed during in the short run, which we take as the
time required to complete a fishing trip.
Harvest, hi for species i, denotes the quantity of fish that is intercepted by the fishing
gear, i.e., the quantity of fish that is caught and retreived to the deck of the vessel. Land-
ings, li, may be less than harvest with the difference being the quantity that is discarded
at sea. Thus hi = li + di, where di ≥ 0 denotes discard quantity of species i fish.
The per-trip profit maximization problem for a representative fisherman is:
pi(p, w, x) = max
0≤l,0≤d
{p′l − c(h,w, x)}, (1)
where c(h,w, x) is the harvest cost, h = (h1, ..., hM ) is the harvest vector, w denotes
input prices and x is an M -vector of stock abundances. In addition to the technological
constraints, embedded in the cost function, the maximization is subject to the regulations
imposed by the fishery manager, which we discuss shortly.
We assume c(h,w, x) is convex in h and increasing and concave in w. We assume the
technology exhibits weak output disposability. This structural property captures the costly
targeting aspect of multiple-species fishing wherein the fishermen may be required to search
more, or modify their gear and fishing practices to avoid harvesting a particular species
of fish. For example, selecting a harvest vector that includes a relatively small amount of
a species that is relatively abundant in the region chosen for fishing will introduce added
costs. Some fishing locations, dates and depths may have to be avoided to reduce encoun-
ters with the non-targeted species. Alternatively it may be necessary to modify gear and
bait to attract and intercept the target while avoiding non-target species. Measures taken
to avoid an unwanted species raises fishing costs.10
The total costs of harvesting h will therefore depend on the composition of the fish stock
in the region of fishing. Suppose stock xi is abundant in the region of fishing. Harvesting
10The targeting ability of fishermen in multiple-species fisheries is well documented (Kirkley and Strand,
1988; Campbell and Nicholl, 1994; Branch and Hilborn 2008; Turner 1995, 1997; Singh and Weninger,
2009).
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a vector h with hi = 0 and h−i > 0 can be more more costly than if a large quantity of
species i fish where harvested. The added cost of maintaining hi = 0 arises due to the costly
avoidance measures that are required. The implication of the weak output disposability
property is that, fixing h−i > 0, the cost function can be non-monotonic in the harvest
quantity hi. Put another way, marginal harvesting costs will be negative for some species in
some regions of M -dimensional output space. Letting ci(h,w, x) = ∂c(h,w, x)/∂hi denote
marginal costs.
The weak output disposability property implies that ci(h,w, x) < 0 is possible (likely)
if at h, the share of hi in the harvest bundle is small relative to the share of its stock
abundance in the sea. As hi increases, ci(h,w, x) will eventually become positive. Stock
conditions, absolute and relative abundance of individual species can vary across space,
within the fishing season, or over longer time periods as some stocks grow or decline due
to natural mortality or aggregate fishing pressure. Stock conditions vary regionally and
temporally which creates spatial-temporal variation in the targeting cost properties of the
technology, and in the spatial-temporal harvesting behavior of fishermen.
Conditional on the region of fishing, fishermen select a harvest vector that maximizes
profit. The chosen mix may differ from the mix of stocks in the sea. We assume that the
costs that arise from avoidance behaviors increases with the mismatch between the harvest
vector, h, and the stock abundance, x. If, on the other hand, a fisherman is willing to har-
vest a mix of species that is similar in composition to x, fewer costly avoidance measures
are required. To formally capture this feature of the technology, we specify an empirical
cost function that is increasing in the Euclidean distance between the harvest share vector
and a stock share vector. A functional form for c(h,w, x) that exhibits this property is
presented in section 4. The next section explores the behavioral implications of the weak
output disposability property in a regulated multi-species fishery.
3.1 Regulations and fishing behavior
We assume all fishermen strictly adhere to regulations - there is not cheating in our model.
Let J ⊆ M denote a subset of species that are managed with a species-specific landings
constraint. Let li denote the per-trip maximum landing. Similarly, we use K ⊆ M to
denote the subset of species managed with a group maximum landings limit. The species-
group limit regulation takes the form
∑
i∈K li ≤ lK , where lK is the per-trip maximum.
The Lagrangian function for the regulated profit maximization problem is,
L =
∑
i
pili − c(h,w, x) +
∑
i∈J
λi[li − li] + λ[lK −
∑
i∈K
li], (2)
where λi are multiplies for the landings constraints.
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To fix ideas, we first consider the case of no regulation. Ignoring the landings constraints
in 2, the Kuhn-Tucker (KT) necessary conditions are (function arguments are dropped to
reduce notation):
pi − ci ≤ 0 (3a)
li[pi − ci] = 0 (3b)
−ci ≤ 0 (3c)
di[−ci] = 0 (3d)
li, di ≥ 0. (3e)
These above conditions encompass four possibilities: (li > 0, di = 0), (li > 0, di > 0),
(li = 0, di = 0), and (li = 0, di > 0). In the absence of regulation and with positive market
prices, discarding fish at sea will never be part of a profit maximizing harvest strategy, and
thus (li = 0, di > 0) is not discussed further. The condition in equation (3b) is familiar;
harvest is chosen to equate marginal revenue and marginal cost. From condition (3c) we
see that marginal cost is non-negative. Therefore, hi = 0 only if the technology exhibits
strong output disposability. Summarizing, we have two behavioral regimes and associated
necessary conditions:
Regime Outcome KT cond.
B1: li = 0, di = 0 pi − ci ≤ 0
B2: li > 0, di = 0 pi − ci = 0
Next consider the implications of a species-specific fishery closure, i.e., a regulation
landings of species i fish are prohibited. In this case, the maximum landings constraint
can be ignored (λi = 0 for all closed species). The behavioral implications of a closure can
be represented by setting pi = 0. There are two harvest-discard possibilities to consider;
both include li = 0, one with zero discards and one with positive discards:
Regime Outcome Necess. cond.
B1: li = 0, di = 0 −ci < 0
B2: li = 0, di > 0 −ci = 0.
di = 0 requires local strong output disposability. When discards are positive, condition
(3d) profit maximization implies that marginal cost be equal to zero. Under local weak
output disposability, it is likely costs will be lower with hi > 0. However, since landings are
prohibited, di = hi, i.e., it is optimal to harvest a positive quantity of species i fish to forego
costly avoidance measures and discard the harvest at sea since returning the fish to port
generates no (legal) revenue and violates the closure regulation (see Singh and Weninger,
2009 for additional discussion).
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We next consider the case of a maximum landings limit, i.e., i ∈ J . The KT necessary
conditions are,
pi − ci − λi ≤ 0 (4a)
li[pi − ci − λi] = 0 (4b)
−ci ≤ 0 (4c)
di[−ci] = 0 (4d)
λi[li − li] = 0 (4e)
li, di λi ≥ 0. (4f)
The following behavioral regimes and necessary conditions apply:
Outcome Necess. cond.
B1: li = 0, di = 0 pi − ci < 0
B2: 0 < li < li, di = 0 pi − ci = 0
B3: li = li, di = 0 pi − ci = λi
B4: li = li, di > 0 −ci = 0.
Again, regime B1 is possible only with strong output disposability. If the landings
constraint is slack, as in B2, we have an interior solution with, λi = 0. From (4b) marginal
profit must be zero, which combined with (4d), and assuming a positive price, implies
di = 0. Under B3 and B4, the landings constraint binds, and thus λi > 0. If discards are
zero (B3), the marginal profit is equal to the multiplier λi, which reflects the shadow cost
of the constraint, li. For regime B4, the landings limit binds and discards are positive.
From condition (4d) we see that −ci = 0 when di > 0. Case B4 requires zero marginal cost
for species i, which suggests li = li, and di > 0 is likely when the landings limit is small
relative to harvests of other species.
The KT necessary conditions for a species regulated by a group landings limit (i ∈ K)
include:
pi − ci − λK ≤ 0 (5a)
li[pi − ci − λK ] = 0 (5b)
−ci ≤ 0 (5c)
di[−ci] = 0 (5d)
λK [lK −
∑
i∈K
li] = 0 (5e)
li, di, λK ≥ 0. (5f)
The group landings constraint may bind with li = 0. Additional harvest-discard regimes
must be considered. Assume prices are strictly positive. Suppose initially that the group
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landings constraint is slack, such that λK = 0. With a positive price,
∑
i∈K li < lK and
hi > 0, the combination (li = 0, di > 0) or (li > 0, /di > 0) cannot be part of a profit
maximizing harvest strategy, which leaves the following regimes:
Regime Outcome Necess. cond.
B1:
∑
i∈K li < lK , li = 0, di = 0 pi − ci < 0
B2:
∑
i∈K li < lK , li > 0, di = 0 pi − ci = 0
B3:
∑
i∈K li = lK , li > 0, di = 0 pi − ci = λK
B4:
∑
i∈K li = lK , li > 0, di > 0 pi = λK
B5:
∑
i∈K li = lK , li = 0, di = 0 pi − ci < λK
B6:
∑
i∈K li = lK , li = 0, di > 0 pi < λK
Under regimes B1 and B5, hi = 0, which implies local strong output disposability. If
the technology exhibits local weak output disposability, marginal cost will be negative at
hi = 0, requiring hi = di > 0 in order to minimize cost.
At an interior landings solution, as in B2, the group landing constraint is slack, λK = 0.
Suppose the group landings constraint binds with positive landings of species i (B3-B4).
If discards are zero, condition (5c) and (5d) imply non-negative marginal cost. From KT
condition (5b), profit maximization requires hi be chosen to equate marginal profit with λK .
Regime B4 includes a binding group landings constraint, positive landings and positive
discards. From KT condition (5d), marginal cost is zero when di > 0. Substituting into
(5b) obtains the necessary condition pi = λK . In this knife-edge scenario, positive species
i harvests arise jointly with the harvests of other species in the group. The price pi is suffi-
ciently high to warrant landing species i fish. This regime involves a form of high-grading
behavior where the fisherman is indifferent between landing species i fish and discarding
it to make room for other species in the group.
Regime B6 includes a binding group landings constraint, with li = 0 and di > 0. With
li = 0 condition (5a) implies pi − ci − λK < 0. Substituting −ci = 0 which holds when
di > 0 obtains the condition pi < λK . This regime describes a more standard high-grading
scenario where, due to a low dockside price, species i fish is discarded to make room for
more profitable species in the group.
A final observation is that a species-group landings constraint acts similarly to a vessel
hold capacity constraint. Here the group landings constraint includes all harvested species.
The KT necessary conditions (5a) - (5f) apply, with possible behavioral regimes B1-B6.
We now consider the behavioral implications on an individual transferable quota (ITQ)
regulation. ITQs replace closures and landing limits with tradeable landings permits. Fish-
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erman can legally land any quantity as long as they possess sufficient quota. If the quota
binds at the fleet level, i.e., quota is scarce, a positive quota price will emerge that is
equal to the marginal profit of landing an additional unit of species i fish. The necessary
conditions for profit maximization are obtained by inserting the net price, the dockside
price less the quota (lease) price, into the equation (2). Regime B1, zero harvests and
landings for some species i, is possible under strong output disposability. If the net price
is strictly positive and the fisherman owns quota, no discarding will occur and regime B2
(ii > 0, di = 0) applies. If the quota binds stringently, the net price can be equal to zero.
In this case, marginal costs must also be zero and discards will be positive, i.e., regime B4
applies with the landings constraint replaced by a quota holdings constraint.
4 Data and estimation
4.1 Data
Our data are from the National Marine Fisheries Service log book reporting system and a
survey of annual operating expenses conducted by the Southeast Fisheries Science Center.
The data period includes the 2005-10 calendar years. Regulations require vessel operators
record per-trip harvest quantity by species, gear type used, primary region of fishing, and
depth at which the bulk of the harvesting occurred. The logbook system also records the
number of crew on board the vessel, quantity and type of gear used, and other trip char-
acteristics. In 2003, a Trip Expense and Payment Section was added to the logbook form
which collected information on trip revenue by species and trip expenses for fuel, bait, ice,
and food. Beginning in 2005, expense and payment data collection became mandatory
for a stratified sample of permitted reef fish vessels; 39.4% of the 2005-10 data record
cost information. A second stratified sample of reef fish fishermen are required to record
trip discard quantities by species; 17.5% of the 2005-10 trips record discard information.
The data we use for our analysis consists of reef fish trips that have records of expense and
discards; 7.72% of 2005-10 trips are included in our analysis for a total of 4,963 observations.
Preliminary analysis revealed data entries that were not representative of the median
trip observation. Trips that recorded extreme costs per landed pound, less than $0.04 per
pound and in excess of $2.50 per pound, were dropped. Trips that recorded less than 100
pounds landed across all species were removed. Trips taken in region 12, which corresponds
to the New Orleans estuary were also dropped. Finally we deemed landings of more than
10,000 pounds of one particular species to be non-typical (the average landings of all species
for vertical line gear is 1,854.61 pounds). Remaining data includes 3,558 vertical line gear
trips and 304 longline trips.
Tractability requires that individual reef fish species be aggregated into output groups.
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Groups are formed based on economic and regulatory importance or similarity of harvest-
ing. There are four major harvested species in the reef fish fishery: h1- red snapper; h2-
vermilion and other shallow water snappers; h3- red grouper; and h4- gag grouper. The
remaining reef fish species are aggregated into output groups based on similarity of har-
vesting practice, e.g., fishing locations, depths, baits, and capture methods yielding three
additional outputs: h5- other shallow water groupers, h6- deep water groupers and tile-
fishes, and h7- all other reef fish species.
11 Descriptive statistics for trip-level costs, prices
and harvest are reported in an appendix.
Stock abundance varies across space and time. Space is measured using the coarse
geographical region in which the bulk of the each trip’s catch is taken (see Figure 1). The
measure (index) takes the value of 2 on trips taken in the Florida Keys and 21 for trips
taken in waters off the southern Texas coast. Note that space is treated as a continuous
variable in our model and much finer-scaled location information (e.g., latitude, longitude)
could be incorporated if available. Our data lists the date that the trip’s catch is landed at
port. We specify a seasonal time index s which indicates the day of the year that landings
are recorded, and a coarse index t which is set equal to the cumulative days since January
1, 2005. We impose the restriction that the seasonal effect on harvest cost on January 1
equal the effect on December 31 of each year.
Empirical implementation of our behavioral model is complicated by the fact that stock
abundance is unobserved by the researcher at the relevant scale. Fisheries scientists rely
on models that estimate total biomass for a fish species, the geographical boundaries of
the species’ habitat, preferred depths and, possibly, temporal migration patterns. The
spatial, temporal and depth scale at which this information is available is coarse at best,
or nonexistent. Our empirical approach is to estimate the stock composition, in fact the
share of each species within as a latent variable. Details for this estimation are provided
in section 4 below.
Table 1 reports the percentage of trips falling into key behavioral regimes. Rows 1-7
report trips taken under controlled access management and rows 8-12 report trips taken
under ITQ management. The table further separates trips taken during regulatory open
and closed periods.
The results in table 1 suggest reef fish fishermen have considerable control over the
11Harvested quantities within each output category are aggregated linearly. The aggregation procedure
assumes that optimal input choices and aggregate output levels can be chosen independently of the mix
of species within each output category. The harvest technology is thus assumed to exhibit weak output
separability. Linear aggregation implies a constant rate of transformation among species within each output
group. These assumptions are consistent with fishing practices as described to us by reef fish fishermen.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that output aggregation could bias the results that follow.
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B1 B2 B4 B6 B1 B2 B4 B6
Row Species Fishery open Fishery closed
1 Red Snap. 17.57 20.99 76.96 4.33 59.42 0.90 1.26 38.41
2 Verm. Snp. 25.31 59.91 13.84 0.94 - - - -
3 Red Group. 40.06 19.13 44.80 2.06 78.92 3.20 0.87 17.01
4 Gag Group. 52.18 27.24 21.25 2.81 82.27 0.73 0.15 16.86
5 Oth. SWG 45.06 33.45 10.12 7.97 56.98 24.13 5.96 11.92
6 DWG/Tile. 73.83 25.08 1.46 0.34 91.46 3.88 0.93 3.73
7 Oth. Spec. 28.65 45.08 19.97 0.33 - - - -
With ITQs Without ITQs
8 Red Snap. 13.16 40.36 34.13 12.35 64.30 0.59 34.45 0.67
9 Red group. 12.67 36.11 50.29 0.93 88.36 7.40 1.68 2.56
10 Gag group. 28.02 38.43 24.88 8.66 87.28 4.69 1.23 6.81
11 Oth. SWG 27.83 47.42 10.28 6.82 69.75 23.55 2.57 3.35
12 DWG/Tile. 75.12 23.23 1.34 0.32 77.34 20.76 1.56 0.33
Table 1: Regulations and Targeting Behavior. Table reports per-
centage trips taken during 2005-10 in behavioral regimes, B1 (li =
di = 0), B2 (li > 0, di = 0), B4 (li > 0, di > 0), and B6
(li = 0, di > 0).
mix of species that are intercepted by their gear, and modify their targeting behavior in
response to the regulations they face. For example, consider red snapper under the con-
trolled access regulation (row 1). When the red snapper fishery is open, 17.57% of trips
avoid red snapper altogether. When the red snapper fishery is closed, 59.43% of trips avoid
red snapper. Avoiding red snapper under a closure appears feasible, consistent with the
property of local strong output disposability.
When the red snapper fishery is open 4.33% of trips include zero landings but positive
discards (regime B6). These discards can be attributed to the minimum size restrictions
which prohibits landings of red snapper less than 15 inches in length. Notice that when
red snapper is closed, the regime B6 trips are more frequent at 38.41%. Under ITQ man-
agement (row 8), we see that reef fish fishermen who do not hold quota avoid intercepting
red snapper; 64.30% of trips report no red snapper landings or discards (regime 1). We
also see that trips with positive harvests but no landings are rare under ITQ management
at 0.67%, considerably lower than under controlled access.
Harvesting patterns are similar for the other reef fish species. In sum, table 1 provides
strong evidence that fishermen are able avoid species that are closed for fishing or for which
they do not own quota. Evidence further suggests that avoidance is costly because discards
of species that cannot be legally landed occur regularly in the data.
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Vessel, Crew, Trip Revenue and Cost
Vertical Line trips Longline trips
Mean Std. Min. Max. Mean Std. Min. Max.
Vessel length (feet) 37.59 8.88 22 67 44.63 6.56 31 69
Crew 2.61 1.10 1 21 3.10 1.17 1 8
Days/trip 4.12 2.74 1 17 9.54 3.23 1 18
Landings (’000 lbs.) 2.03 1.97 0.13 13.92 3.77 1.96 0.22 9.94
Discards (’000 lbs.) 0.29 0.63 0.00 8.71 1.02 1.56 0.00 10.52
Revenue (’000 $) 5.15 5.57 0.07 46.61 12.03 6.44 0.51 30.13
Variable exp. (’000 $) 0.83 0.66 0.10 6.42 2.47 0.96 0.37 7.17
Labor exp.s (’000 $) 1.63 1.71 0.02 12.09 3.18 1.73 0.14 8.10
Harvest shares
Vertical Line trips Longline trips
Mean Std. Min. Max. Mean Std. Min. Max.
Red snapper 0.25 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.54
Vermilion snapper 0.29 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.43
Red grouper 0.22 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.45 0.41 0.00 1.00
Gag grouper 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.99 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.44
Other s.w. grouper 0.03 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.10 0.00 1.00
D.W. grouper/tilefish 0.02 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.40 0.00 1.00
All other species 0.13 0.17 0.00 0.99 0.10 0.17 0.00 0.86
Table 2: Data Descriptive Statistics. Data include 3,558 vertical line
gear trips by 229 vessels, and 304 longline gear trips by 29 vessels.
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Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for vessel length and crew size, trip revenue, costs
and shares of harvested species. The data are separated by gear type and include 3,558
vertical line trips (92.1 %) and 304 (7.9 %) longline gear trips.
The average length of a vertical line gear boat is 37.59 feet. Longline trip boats are
7.04 feet longer on average. In general longline trips use larger crews, spend more days at
sea, and have higher per-trip landings, discards, revenues, and expenses. The percentage
of harvests that are discarded at sea for longline gear trips is also larger at 21.3 % versus
14.3 % for vertical line.
Average harvest shares across trips reveal the importance of the various reef fish species.
On vertical line gear trips, the largest harvest share species are vermilion snapper, 29%,
red snapper, 25%, red grouper, 22% and all other reef fish species, 13%. For vertical line
trips, red grouper makes up the largest share of harvest at 41% with deep water groupers
second at 32% and all other reef fish species accounting for 10% of the average trip harvest.
4.2 Estimation
The model can be estimated from observation of the variable cost equation and the M KT
necessary conditions for profit maximization. We append an additive error to each of these
conditions. Errors are is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and finite
variance. Let ε0 denote the cost equation error; εi, i = 1, . . . ,M will denote the error
term for the KT necessary conditions. The variance terms are denoted σ2j j = 0, 1, . . . ,M .
We assume E[εjε
′
j ] = 0, for all j 6= j′. The independence assumption is necessary given
unobserved stock conditions, discussed below, and simplifies the estimation considerably.
As with many commercial fisheries, crew in the GOM reef fish fishery are paid a share
of the trip revenues.12 We subtract the labor costs (1 − η)∑i pili from the trip profit
in equation (1). The residual revenue to the skipper of the vessel is η
∑
i pili. Necessary
conditions for profit maximization are adjusted accordingly.
With these assumptions, the estimating equations take the form,
c− c(h, θ) = ε0
ηpe1 − c1(h, θ) = ε1
...
ηpeM − cM (h, θ) = εM ,
12Some vessel operators deduct a portion of trip expenses before calculating the crew share. Crew shares
can vary considerably depending on the experience of crew members, ownership structure of the vessel, i.e.,
owner-operated versus hired skippers, and idiosyncratically across fishermen. Our data do not allow use to
identify the precise remuneration scheme that is used on each vessel operation.
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where c(h, θ) is the empirical cost function with parameter vector θ.
We next derive the likelihood function for the model. The behavioral regimes presented
above can be organized to three categories: (1) hi = 0, (2) 0 < hi ≤ li, and (3) hi ≥ li. In
addition, the fishery may be open or closed, or if an ITQ program is in place, the vessel
may or may not own quota. If the fishery is open or the fisherman holds quota, landings
are permitted and the effective price at the dock is the prevailing market price. When
the fishery is closed, or not quota is available, the effective price is zero. Within category
(3), discards may be zero, in which case, the effective price is again the prevailing market
price. If hi > li and discards are positive, marginal harvests yield no additional revenue
and therefore the effective price is zero.
We use pei to denote the effective price for species i fish. Let y denote the observed data
for a representative trip: y = (c, h1, . . . , hM ). Define an indicator variable I(hi > 0) = 1 if
the harvest of species i is positive and zero otherwise. Define a second indicator variable
I(hi > li) = 1 if the harvest of species i fish exceeds the maximum landings limit or the
vessel hold capacity, and zero otherwise.
The likelihood of observing y is,
`(θ|y) = φ(c− c
σ0
)×
M∏
i=1
 [[1− I(hi > 0)]Φ(
−ηpei+ci
σi
)
+[I(hi > 0)][1− I(hi > li)]φ(ηp
e
i−ci
σi
+[I(hi > 0)][I(hi > li)]Φ(
ηpei−ci
σi
)

× det |J(y)| ,
where J(y) denotes the Jacobian of the transformation from the vector of shocks (ε0, ε1, . . . , εM ),
to the data vector y = (c, h1, . . . , hM ).
The Jacobian matrix is therefore,
J(y) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 −c1 · · · −cM
0 −c11 · · · −c1M
...
...
. . .
...
0 −cM1 · · · −cMM
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (3)
Letting n = 1, ..., N index individual fishing trips, the likelihood of observing the pa-
rameters θ given the full sample data Y = {yn}Nn=1 is,
L(θ|Y ) =
N∏
n=1
`(θ|yn). (4)
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4.2.1 Functional forms
The functional form for the harvest cost function is adopted from Singh and Weninger
(2009):
c(h,w, z|γ, α) = α0 +
[
1 +
γ
2
∑
i
[si(h)− ϕi(x)]2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
× exp
[∑
i
αihi + βkk
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
. (5)
The first right-hand term, A, reflects the cost of the targeting efforts made on the fish-
ing trip; si(h) = hi/
∑
i hi denotes the harvest share of species i. The term ϕi(x) denotes
a corresponding stock abundance share for species i. As discussed earlier, if a fisherman
chooses a harvest vector such that si(h) = ϕi(x) for all i, avoidance/targeting efforts are
not required. In this case, A = 1 and trip costs are determined exclusively by the second
term, B, which measures the non-target or extraction component of the full harvest cost.
Note that the magnitude of A increases with the Euclidean distance between harvest share
vector and the zero-target-cost share ϕ(x) = (ϕ1(x), ..., ϕM (x)). The extraction cost com-
ponent B depends on the quantity of harvested fish, plus additional conditioning variables,
k. The elements of k are discussed in results section below.
We assume the composition of the fish stock varies by location, date, and depth. Let
zn summarize data on the location, date and depth of fishing trip n. We approximate ϕ(x)
as,
ϕn,i(z, δi) =
exp(φ(zn, δi))∑M
i=1 exp(φ(zn, δi))
, (6)
where δi is vector of parameters. The specification in equation (6) ensures that each
share is contained in the interval [0, 1] and that shares sum to 1 as required. The functional
form for φ(z, δi) is specified as a Chebychev polynomial function (Miranda and Fackler,
2002). Details are presented in 5.
5 Results
We report estimates of α and γ in an appendix. The Chebychev polynomial coefficients
are difficult to interpret individually and, to save space, are not reported. We report the
fitted zero-target-costs shares below. Most parameters are estimated with small standard
error.13 The R-squared statistic for the cost function equation is 62.9%, suggesting a good
13A test of the null hypothesis that each parameter is equal to zero is rejected at the 99% confidence
interval in all but 3 cases. Two of the δ parameters are statistically different from zero at the 95% level, one δ
parameter is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Regulations in the reef fish fishery force wide variation
in absolute harvest levels, and relative harvest mix which undoubtedly aides in parameter identification.
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fit for incomplete panel data.
The model parameters are not directly interpretable. Economic effects of interest can
be calculated from the model. Confidence intervals for these effects can be obtained with
bootstrap methods. To conserve space we focus on point estimates and discuss a subset of
results that illustrate the key properties of the technology.
Estimates of the variance terms associated with the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions,
σ1, . . . , σ7, are considerably larger than the cost equation variance. This reflects data
scaling, costs and harvest quantities were scaled to thousands of dollars and pounds, re-
spectively, to improve condition of the model.
We find that reef fish fishermen are able to target a particularly mix of species and incur
modest cost increases to do so. The targeting component A of equation (5) is calculated for
each trip and averaged across gear types. The result for vertical line gear trips (n=3,254)
is 1.086, which suggests that, on average, 8.6% of vertical line trip costs can be attributed
to the targeting efforts of fishermen. For longline gear trips (n=304), we find that 5.5%
of trip costs derive from fishermen’s targeting efforts. Keep in mind that variable costs on
longline trip are almost three time larger than vertical line trips, averaging $2,472 per trip
versus $833 per trip and thus absolute targeting costs in our sample for longline gear trips
are estimated at $135.96 per trip compared to $71.64 per trip for vertical line gear trips.
The structural properties of the fitted cost function explains changes in fleet size that
have taken place in the western region of the fishery, and suggests potential for additional
fleet restructuring under the new grouper-tilefish quota management program (introduced
in 2010). We calculate the cost elasticity for both gear types. Results suggest that a 10%
increase in the per-trip harvest, holding the mix of harvested species fixed, raises trip vari-
able costs an average of 5.14% on vertical line gear trips. A 10% increase in the harvest
on longline gear trips raises variable costs by an average of 4.19%. These findings suggest
reef fish fishermen in our data operated in a region of increasing returns to scale during the
2005-10 data period and that variable costs could be reduced if the catch were consolidated
onto fewer trips. This is not surprising given the focus of the regulations in the fishery,
particularly the temporal closure policies and per-trip landings limits. Quota manage-
ment programs encourage fishermen to consolidate quota and exploit available economies
of scale. Our results suggest further fleet downsizing in response to the recently introduced
grouper-tilefish quota program are likely.14
14Evidence of fleet downsizing caused by introduction of the red snapper quota program is apparent in
the logbook data. The number of trips taken in the western region of the fishery, where red snapper is
most prevalent, fell from 3,289 to 1,585 in the first year of the red snapper quota program, 2007. The
average catch per trip has increased from 1,872.42 pounds in 2006 to 3,954.06 pounds in 2010, with a 58%
increase in 2007, the first year of the program. The number of participating vessels in the western regions
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Figure 2: φi(z|δ̂) fitted values across Gulf regions (major target
species)
We next consider the targeting properties of the estimated harvest technology. To illus-
trate, Figure 2 plots the fitted values for the zero-target-cost share vectors, φi(z|δ̂), or φi’s
for short, across space (solid lines). Values for five major harvested species are reported.15
Results in the figure assume a representative fishing trip taken mid-year in 2009 at 150
feet depth, which is the median depth in our sample. For comparison, we also report the
average observed catch shares in our data (solid circles). The left-hand of the graph cor-
responds to region 21 in waters off southern Texas. The right-hand side corresponds to
region 1 in the Florida keys (see figure 1).
has fallen as quota are consolidated onto few vessels. An estimate of the fleet structure projected under
quota management is possible with additional information on vessel fixed operating costs. Such an analysis
is beyond the scope the current paper.
15The estimated values of φ5, other shallow water groupers averages 0.028 across the Gulf regions and
shows very little spatial variation. Similarly, the estimate of φ7 is 0.125 also with little spatial variation.
To avoid clutter these results are not reported.
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In panel (a) we see that the zero-target-cost harvest share for red snapper is high in
the west, roughly 80% of the trip catch in region 21, and falls to almost 0% of trip catch
in the eastern region of the fishery. The average red snapper harvest share in our sample
data varies around the fitted φ1 value.
Panel (b) in Figure 2 shows the vermilian snapper value, φ2, is low in the western
region, rises to roughly 40% in central regions, falls in regions 3-7 and rises sharply to over
80% in the east. The sharp rise in Florida Keys (regions 1-3) is explained by our decision to
combine vermilian with other snapper species. Vermilian snapper habitat is not spatially
disjoint as shown in panel (b) but is most prevalent in central Gulf regions (8-13). Average
catch shares in our sample data also vary around the fitted φ2 value.
Red and gag grouper zero-target-costs shares, φ3 and φ4, are reported in panels (c) and
(d) of figure 2. The results indicate that grouper species are most prevalent in waters off
of the Florida coast, regions 2-7. Sample average harvest shares indicate that reef fish fish-
ermen tend to incur costs to target red grouper. The sample average gag grouper harvest
share closely follows the fitted value for φ4.
The results for deep water groupers and tilefish (panel (e) in Figure 2) indicate fitted
values for φ7 between 5%-20% in the western region and values close to zero in the eastern
regions of the fishery.
Table 3 reports estimates of variable cost, ray average variable costs and marginal costs
for the five main target species. The results are reported for two trip types, one taken
in the eastern region 5 and the other taken in western region 15. Both trips are taken
mid-year 2008 (roughly the mid-point of our data) in 150 feet of water. We vary the size of
the harvest vector holding shares constant at the sample mean for vertical line gear trips.16
Total trip pounds is varied from 1,000 to 6,000 which captures the range observed in our
sample.
The results for the western Gulf region trip show trip costs rising from $870 to $1,820,
and ray average variable costs falling from $0.87 to $0.30 per pound as the harvest in-
creases. Falling ray average variable costs is consistent with the cost elasticity calculations
above and increasing returns to size in our sample data. Turning to the species-specific
marginal cost estimates we see that ĉ1 (red snapper marginal cost) is negative at small
harvest quantities. Red snapper marginal cost increases and become positive, but remains
small, at higher harvest levels. This result highlights the weak output disposability prop-
erty of the reef fish targeting technology. Recall from figure 2, that the zero-target-cost
16Average harvest shares in our sample are: 0.25 (red snapper); 0.29 (vermilian snapper); 0.22 (red
grouper); 0.07 (gag grouper); 0.03 (other shallow water groupers); 0.02 (deep water groupers and tilefish);
0.13 (all other species). The 10% (90%) per-trip harvest quantity on vertical line trips is 280 (4,790) pounds.
21
Western Region Trip
Pounds/trip Cost AVC ĉ1 ĉ2 ĉ3 ĉ4 ĉ6
1,000 $620 $0.62 -$0.53 $0.79 $0.48 $0.15 -$0.38
2,000 780 0.39 -0.19 0.51 0.38 0.16 0.08
3,000 950 0.32 -0.07 0.43 0.36 0.17 0.24
4,000 1,130 0.28 -0.01 0.39 0.35 0.18 0.34
5,000 1,320 0.26 0.03 0.38 0.35 0.19 0.41
6,000 1,510 0.25 0.06 0.37 0.36 0.19 0.46
Eastern Region Trip
Pounds/trip Cost AVC ĉ1 ĉ2 ĉ3 ĉ4 ĉ6
1,000 $870 $0.87 $0.53 $0.70 -$1.40 -$0.33 $0.27
2,000 1,050 0.52 0.37 0.48 -0.59 -0.08 0.43
3,000 1,230 0.41 0.32 0.41 -0.31 0.01 0.51
4,000 1,420 0.35 0.30 0.38 -0.17 0.05 0.55
5,000 1,620 0.32 0.29 0.37 -0.08 0.08 0.60
6,000 1,820 0.30 0.19 0.36 -0.01 0.11 0.63
Table 3: Targeting Cost Across Space. Cost estimates are for a
median vessel using vertical line gear, mid-year 2010, in 150 feet of
water. Harvest shares are fixed at sample average values for vertical
line trips.
share for red snapper in the west is in the range of 50%-80%. Results in table 3 maintain
red snapper harvest share at 25% of trip catch which, at low harvest quantities, results in
negative marginal costs. As the size of the harvest vector increases marginal extraction
costs, which are increasing, dominate the targeting cost effect and marginal costs turn
positive.
The deep water grouper and tilefish species group also exhibits the weak output dis-
posability property and negative marginal costs at low harvest quantities. Marginal costs
for vermilian snapper, red and gag groupers are positive throughout the range of harvests
considered in table 3.
Turning to the eastern trip results, we see that the marginal cost for red snapper is
positive and much larger at all harvest vectors considered. This confirms that the weak
output disposability property is a spatially local phenomenon driven by local stock condi-
tions. Red snapper marginal costs are positive in the eastern region, consistent with the
relatively small estimated value for φ̂1 in figure 2. Weak output disposability is apparent
for red and gag grouper in the eastern region of the fishery. Form figure 2 we see that the
zero-target-cost harvest share for red grouper is as high as 40% whereas the red grouper
share in table 3 is held at 22% of trip catch. Similarly, the zero-target-cost harvest share
for gag grouper is roughly 10% in region 5; the gag grouper share is held at 7% in table 3.
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Investigations of the longline gear technology yields similar costly targeting properties
which vary across regions of the fishery.
Summarizing, negative marginal cost for red snapper and deep water groupers and tile-
fish in the west, and for red and gag grouper in the east, suggest that fishermen on trips
taken during closures, or fishermen who face tight landings limits, have strong incentive to
discard fish at sea. The fitted model finds that fishermen can lower their costs by intercept-
ing and discarding some species rather than undertaking costly measures to avoid them.
The next section presents results from simulations to further demonstrate the implications
of the technology, and the weak output disposability property, for targeting and discarding
behavior.
6 Policy analysis
This section reports results from simulations using the fitted cost model. We programmed
an optimization routine to calculate the per-trip variable profit maximizing harvest vector,
separated by landings and discards, under the various regulations experienced by fishermen
in our sample. We consider a vertical line gear trip taken mid-year in 2009 in 150 feet of
water. Trip landings are constrained at 5,000 total pounds to reflect the hold capacity
constraint on a typical vessel. There is however no limit imposed on the harvest, and we
will see that in some cases profit maximization involves discarding fish at sea. We report
trip variable profits which include the revenues less operating expenses and payments to
the crew, calculated as the sample mean crew share times trip revenue. Prices are set in
the range observed in the 2009 fishing season, with some adjustment to prevent dominant
prices dictating the targeting activity of our representative fisherman.
6.1 Closures, trip limits and IFQ regulations
Figure 3 reports variable profits under five management scenarios. Panel (a) reports base-
line variable profits where no regulations are imposed on harvesting activity. Trip vari-
able profit average $9,634 across regions with slight regional variation, which results from
changes in relative stock abundance across space. Lower trip profit in the west, for exam-
ple, is due to a relatively low red snapper price chosen for the simulation. That is, higher
prices species, e.g., shallow water groupers, are less prevalent and more considerably more
costly to harvests in the west which causes the reduced trip profit.
The results in panels (b)-(e) report percentage change in trip variable profit from the
baseline, under four types of regulation. The dashed line demarcates zero profit change
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Figure 3: Prices, Regulations and Fishing Behavior
and we see that in each case regulations lower or have not effect on profits as required.
The results in panel (b) show the effect of a 200 pound red snapper landings limit. The
average profit decline across the fishery is 2.42%. The profit decline ranges between 4%-7%
in the western region and indicates no profit decline in the east. This result is driven by
differences the relative abundance across regions of the fishery.
Additional results from simulation show the implications of landings limits for targeting
behavior and discarding under local weak output disposability. Not surprisingly, the 200
red snapper landings limit causes a targeting shift toward other species, particular vermil-
ian snapper in the west region of the fishery. Our model also predicts large red snapper
discards under a 200 pound landings cap, also in the western region. Red snapper discards
range between 250-1,000 pounds, more than landings in regions 13-21. Recall that the
zero-target cost share for red snapper is high in the west, whereas a 200 pound landings
limit amounts to only 4% of a 5,000 pound trip harvest.
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Panel (c) in figure 3 simulates the effect of a shallow water grouper closure. This reg-
ulation is constructed by setting the red, gag and other shallow water grouper prices to
zero. The variable profit decline is estimated between 3%-8% of the baseline in waters
off northern Florida (regions 3-8) where shallow water groupers are relatively abundant.
The model predicts discards of red grouper in these same regions. This finding is again
explained by the weak output disposability property for groupers in the eastern region of
the fishery.
Panels (d) and (e) simulate the effects of red snapper and grouper price decline of 25%
from baseline prices. These scenarios are intended to capture the effects of introducing a
quota management program for these species, while maintain no regulation for remaining
species.17. When quota is tradable a quota rental price will emerge and this value must be
deducted from the dockside price. Panels (d) and (e) are intended to capture the effect of
a modest quote rental price set to 25% of dockside prices.
For reasons that are now well understood, profit declines caused by a red snapper net
price drop are largest in the western region. Not apparent in the figure, however, is that
the red snapper price decline causes a large change in targeting behavior on western trips.
Lower red snapper price cause fishermen to target other reef fish species. The model pre-
dict a 26.5% increase in vermilian snapper harvests and landings above baseline levels. The
model also predicts discards of red snapper at low prices. This behavior is an example of
high grading, although in our simulation discards are motivated by the vessel hold capacity
constraint rather than a red snapper quota constraint.
Panel (e) of figure 3 reports results for a 25% reduction in the price for all groupers and
tilefish. Variable profit declines are largest in the eastern region where these species are
most prevalent. We again find substitution toward higher priced species, in this scenario,
vermilian snapper and the miscellaneous species group. Lastly, the results indicate discards
of lower priced species, red grouper, which again is driven by the hold capacity constraint
on total trip landings.
The results reported in Figure 3 represent a small number of scenarios of interest to
regulators. We also simulated behavioral effects of changes in fuel prices, fishing in different
seasons, years and depths, and examined harvest and discard behavior for longline fishing
gear. These simulations further demonstrate the power of our model as a policy evaluation
tool. Results are not reported here to save space.
17This is how the quota management was introduced in the Gulf reef fish fishery: red snapper in 2007,
groupers and tilefish in 2010. Remaining reef fish species continue to be managed under controlled access
regulation
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6.2 Sea-turtle bycatch policy
This section examines the behavioral implications of sea turtle bycatch management poli-
cies for longline gear fishermen. Amendment 32 to the reef fish management plan imposed
depth closures, limits on the number of hooks onboard a vessel and reductions in the size
of the longline fleet. We examine each of these regulations in seriatim.
Figure 4: Fitted Zero-Target-Cost Harvest Shares.
Pushing vessels into deeper waters will affect targeting behavior if the composition of
the stock varies with depth. Figure 4 reports fitted zero-target-cost shares over the range
of fishing depths observed in our sample. We see that for snappers, and gag grouper, the
fitted φi’s vary modestly with depth. For red grouper and deepwater grouper and tilefish,
zero-target-cost shares show considerable sensitivity to fishing depth. True to their name,
the deepwater grouper fitted value, φ6, increase from zero in shallow water to over 30% of
the harvest at depths near 1,000 feet.
To demonstrate the implications of depth regulation we conducted additional variable
profit maximization simulations across for rips taken between 50-800 feet of water. Prices
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All Trips All Landings Red Group. Landings
Year V. L. L. L. Total V. L. L. L. Total V. L. L. L. Total
2005 10,154 2,028 12,182 10,604 7,508 18,113 1,346 3,085 4,430
2006 9,749 2,128 11,877 10,429 7,482 17,910 1,346 3,085 4,430
2007 7,136 1,362 8498 9,389 4,968 14,357 1,368 2,991 4,359
2008 7,191 1,385 8,576 9,809 5,338 15,147 1,531 1,938 3,469
2009 7,940 793 8,733 11,462 3,214 14,676 1,857 2,772 4,629
2010 5,612 513 6,125 8,557 2,331 10,887 2,367 1,084 3,451
Table 4: Vertical and Longline Gear Effort and Landings, 2005-10.
Landings are reported in thousands of pounds.
were selected to reflect the mix of species harvested on a typical longline trip in our data.
The results show steady changes in the mix of targeted stocks as the depth of fishing
increases. Per trip profits fall as fishing depths increase although these results must be
interpreted cautiously as they are sensitive to prices. Consistent with the results in figure
4, red snapper, red grouper, and gag grouper shares fall with fishing depth, although the
change in gag grouper share is slight. The predicted share of deep water grouper and tile-
fish in the total catch increases substantially with depth of fishing. The magnitude of the
targeting change varies across regions, suggesting depth regulations can have important,
and spatially heterogeneous implications for targeting behavior of longline fishermen.
A second bycatch management measure we consider is a limit on the number of hooks
carried on board a vessel. Our data do not contain hooks data but do provide information
on the average longline length (longline-gear trips only). We re-estimate our model with
this additional explanatory variable and find that increased longline length lowers trips
costs (the effect is small but statistically significant at the 99% confidence level). To assess
the effect of the regulation, we compare sample predicted costs at observed longline lengths
with costs evaluated at shorter line lengths. If we truncate longline length at the sample
median value, costs are predicted to increase by 2.17%. If we truncate longline length at
the 25’th percentile value on the sample, the model predicts a variable cost increase of
5.95% on longline gear trips. These results can be viewed as illustrative only because the
relationship between longline length and hooks is a choice variable for fishermen. Evidence
suggests, however, harvest costs are increased by the hook limit regulation.
The third bycatch measure implemented under Amendment 31 is a reduction in the
use of longline gear in the fishery. Analysis of the full logbook data offers evidence of the
effect of this regulation. We report (table 4) the number of trips, total pounds harvested,
and total pounds of red grouper harvested per year and by gear type during the 2005-10
seasons. Red grouper is highlighted as it is the main target species for longline gear fish-
ermen (the average share is 45% of trip catch).
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Vertical Line Gear Longline Gear
Pounds/Year RAVC AFC RAC RAVC AFC RAC
30,000 $0.32 $0.89 $1.21 $0.22 1.07 1.29
40,000 0.32 0.67 0.99 0.22 0.81 1.03
50,000 0.32 0.53 0.85 0.22 0.64 0.86
60,000 - - - 0.22 0.54 0.76
70,000 - - - 0.22 0.46 0.66
80,000 - - - 0.22 0.40 0.62
Table 5: Eastern Region Average Cost Estimates. RAVC-denote
ray average variable cost. AFC - denotes average fixed cost. RAVC
- denotes ray average variable costs.
The number of longline gear trips fell from 1,385 to 793 in the first full year of the
bycatch management regulation, 2009, while vertical line gear trips increased. Total trips
increased slightly between 2008 and 2009. It is reasonable to surmise that fishermen whose
longline gear license was revoked under Amendment 31 substituted toward vertical line
fishing.
Total landings by the two gear types declined slightly in 2009. Landings on vertical
line gear trips increased from 9.809 million pounds in 2008 to 11.462 million pounds in
2009. Longline harvest (all species) fell by 43% between 2008 and 2009, from 5.338 million
pounds to 3.214 million pounds. The effect of the regulation on red grouper landings by
longline gear fishermen is even more apparent. In 2008 longline gear boats landed 59.9%
of all red grouper. The longline landings share of red grouper fell to 31.4% in 2009.
Table 4 reveals that Amendment 31 reduced the amount of longline fishing effort and
likely caused an increase in effort and landings with vertical line gear. Whether the reg-
ulation decreased total effort and landings is difficult to know; landings fell from 15.147
million pounds in 2008 to 14.676 million pounds in 2009.18
We supplement our trip-level model with information on annual operating expenses to
provide further insight onto the costs of removing longline gear from the reef fish fishery
(see Appendix B). Table 5 reports ray average variable cost and average fixed cost for a
median vertical line and longline vessel over a range of annual total landings. Logbook
data indicate that annual landings vary between 30,000 and 50,000 pounds for a full time
vessel operation using vertical line gear. Landings for Longline gear boats is higher at
80,000 pounds annually. Vertical line annual harvests exceeding 50,000 pounds are deemed
18The significant drop in total catch to 10.887 million pounds in 2010 is likely the results of the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill which disrupted harvesting operations in a large portion of the fishing ground
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infeasible as they are rarely observed in the logbook data.19 Ray average variable costs
are calculated at the sample average harvest mix for eastern regions trips. We assume the
trip is taken midyear 2009, the first full year of the turtle bycatch regulation. Labor ex-
penditures are a fraction of revenues and therefore do not change across gear types. Labor
expenses are not included in the cost calculations.
The results show that ray average variable costs for longline fishermen is slightly lower
than for vertical line fishermen. However, because longline gear vessels land significantly
more fish per year, and fixed operating expenses do not vary by gear type, average fixed
costs and average total costs (excluding labor) are lower for longline gear fishermen. The
difference for a fully utilized vessel is estimated at $0.23 per pound.
Simple back of the envelope calculations shed further light on the costs of removing
longline gear from the the fishery. Consider a scenario in which the 2009 landings are har-
vested under the 2008 fleet structure, i.e, with 64.5% harvested by vertical line gear and
35.5% by longline gear (rather than the 78.8%, 21.2% split observed in 2009). The 0.23$
per pound cost saving amounts to a foregone $483,000 cost saving in 2009. Carrying out
the same calculation for 2010 yields a cost savings estimate of $340,000; a smaller amount
due to the smaller landings in 2010.
7 Conclusion
Fishery managers regularly employ spatial and temporal closures or depth restrictions to
control harvests in multiple-species fisheries. These regulations affect all aspects of fishing
behavior including harvest patterns, discards, and fishing profits. We introduce and esti-
mate a structural model of a costly targeting technology using data from the GOM reef
fish fishery. The model generates a system of Tobit-type equations which are estimated
with non-linear maximum likelihood. The results yield a vector of target-cost-minimizing
harvest shares which describe the profit opportunities for fishermen across continuous mea-
sures of space, time and depth.
The fitted model characterizes harvesting and targeting costs across space, time and
depth in the Gulf reef fish fishery. Our results show how closure policies and landing limits
provide incentives to discard fish at sea in regions of he fishery. Closures, landings limits
and depth restrictions affect the targeting strategies of reef fish fishermen is complex ways
19Landings data reveal considerable variation in annual landings across vessels, and gear types. Annual
landings for longline gear fishermen are considerably larger than for vertical line gear fishermen. The 90’th
percentile landings value for vertical line vessel ranges between 36,000-44,000 pounds per year in 2005-10.
The 90’th percentile value for longline vessels annual landings ranges between 80,000-86,000 pounds per
year.
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that are linked to relative abundance of reef fish stocks over space, time and depth. Our
model also predicts discard behavior that results from measured local weak output dispos-
ability. Simulations of behavioral responses to prices and regulations across regional, date
and depth dimensions are presented.
Our model overcomes several problems that plague discrete choice models of spatial
fishing behavior. Because our unit of analysis is a multiple-species harvest vector in a
regulated fishery, our model predicts much more than a probability of choosing a fishing
location. Our predictions of harvests and discard across continuous measures of time, space
and depth provide crucial insights that yield important insights for improving regulations
in the Gulf reef fish fishery. Application of the model to other multiple-species fisheries
will prove similar insights.
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9 Appendix A
This appendix derives marginal costs and the Jacobian transformation matrix for the like-
lihood function. The marginal harvesting cost for species i fish is,
∂c(h,w, z|θ)
∂hi
= B
∂A
∂hi
+A
∂B
∂hi
.
Carrying out the derivations obtains:
∂A
∂hi
=
γ
h
[
(si − ϕi)(1− si)−
∑
j 6=i(sj − ϕj)sj
]
=
γ
h
[
(si − ϕi)−
∑M
j=1s
2
j −
∑M
j=1ϕjsj
]
∂B
∂hi
= α1,i + α2,ihi,
where h =
∑
ihi. Function arguments are dropped to ease notation.
The matrix of second derivatives is derived as
∂2c(h,w, z|θ)
∂hi∂hj
=
∂
∂hj
{
B
∂A
∂hi
+A
∂B
∂hi
}
= B
∂2A
∂hi∂hj
+
∂B
∂hj
∂A
∂hi
+
∂A
∂hj
∂B
∂hi
+A
∂2B
∂hi∂hj
.
The terms A, B, ∂A/∂hi and ∂B/∂hi, are presented above. Terms to be evaluated
include, ∂2A/∂hi∂hj and ∂
2B/∂hi∂hj . Carrying out the derivations for the case of j = i
obtains:
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Variable Parm. Std. err. Prob.
Constant -0.693 0.104 0.000
Owner operator -0.109 0.018 0.000
Crew size 0.149 0.036 0.000
Vessel Length -0.001 0.003 0.645
Crew × Length -0.003 0.001 0.000
Longline gear -0.270 0.024 0.000
Table 6: Crew Share Model Parameter Estimates. 16,376 obs. are
available for analysis.
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∂2B
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= α2,i.
When j 6= i we find:
∂2A
∂hi∂hj
= − γ
h
2 [(si − ϕi)−
∑
k(sk − ϕk)sk]
+
γ
h
[−hi
h¯
− 2sj h¯− hj
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=
γ
h¯2
(−2 (si + sj) + (φi + φj) + 3∑ks2k − 2∑kφksk) .
∂2B
∂hi∂hj
= 0.
10 Appendix B
This appendix reports parameters estimates and additional results used in our analysis.
Table 6 reports the results for a crew share model estimated from the full logbook data
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Variable Std. err. Prob.
Constant -3.412 0.899 0.000
ln(Vessel Length) 1.796 0.233 0.000
ln(Horse Power) 0.369 0.102 0.000
Proportion of days fished 0.288 0.055 0.000
Table 7: Fixed Operating Expenses Parameter Estimates. Depen-
dent variable is log of annual operating expenses. The model is
estimated with ordinary leases squares with 178 observations. The
model R-square statistic is 0.40. The F-statistic value is 38.615.
set. We specified the following equation:
CPt =
1
1 + exp(−ztθ) ,
where CPt is the crew payment on trip t and zt denotes explanatory variables for trip: a
constant term; Owner operator, a 0-1 indicator variable equal to unity if the vessel skipper
is also the owner of the vessel; crew size; vessel length and a 0-1 indicator variable set to
unity if the trip used longline gear. The model is estimated with non-linear least squares
regression with 16,376 observations.
Data are from a survey of annual operating expenses conducted by the Southeast Fish-
eries Science Center. Fixed operating expenses include expenditures on tackle, vessel repair
and maintenance, boat dockage fees, insurance, office expenses, and other annual expenses.
Least squares regression was used to fit 178 observations for the 2005-09 fishing seasons
to vessel characteristics. The model R-squared is 0.40. As shown above annual expenses
increase with vessel length, horse power and total days fishing during a season. Additional
regression showed that gear type and the year of fishing had no affect on fixed expenses.
34
